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Abstract—While mainstream RFID research has been 
focused on solving privacy issues, security in general and data 
tampering in specific is still an open question. This paper 
analyzes potential security threats especially data tampering in 
RFID-enabled supply chains and proposes solutions how these 
threats might be addressed using fragile watermarking 
technologies. We first survey RFID system and its security 
problems, and then explain the importance of fragile 
watermarking schemes for RFID systems and possible 
applications using fragile watermarking to detect and locate any 
modification in RFID systems. Finally we suggest possible 
solutions using fragile watermarking for RFID-enabled supply 
chain.
Index Terms—RFID-enabled supply chains, tamper detection, 
fragile watermarking. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in wireless technologies, cost reductions 
and efforts by EPC Global and industry giants, such as 
Wal-Mart, are causing the supply chain industry to shift 
toward broad adoption of radio frequency identification 
(RFID) technology based on emerging open standards. This 
is creating a large business opportunity for RFID industry 
While RFID holds the potential of changing how 
businesses operate today, its implementation is not 
straightforward. A number of issues and challenges, such as 
security/privacy concern, high cost, lack of standards, data 
integration, the required business process redesign, reliability 
of the technology, employee resistance to change, and 
technology choice yet, need to be addressed [1]. While 
mainstream RFID research has been focused on solving 
privacy issues, security in general and data tampering in 
specific is still an open question. EPC Global has not 
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adequately considered the security problem in protocol , and 
the literature mostly focused on using cryptographic 
mechanisms to protect RFID tags tampering, which is 
currently costly from a deployment perspective. Since most 
low cost RFID tags don’t have enough computational power 
and storage capacity to perform encrypted communications, 
most RFID data is transmitted in open air without protection 
which leaves doors open for eavesdroppers and attackers. 
Considering this insecure communication practice, data 
tampering on RFID tags cannot be ruled out, which needs to 
be tackled if a large-scale RFID deployment is to be achieved 
in a cost effective manner. 
Digital watermarking, an emerging technology for data 
protection, provides a promising cheaper way of protecting 
RFID data from illicit manipulation and duplication. In the 
last few years, fragile watermarking schemes for multimedia 
have been extensively studied. Although most of them focus 
on digital images and some have been extended to digital 
video and audio data, little work has been conducted to 
address the RFID data integrity and security issues using 
watermarking technologies. To our knowledge, [2] is the first 
study to propose a fragile watermark solution to identify data 
tampering in RFID tags. The detection is achieved by 
embedding a fragile watermark in the ID stream of the RFID 
tag. But their research is only the beginning steps to provide a 
foundation for more advanced functionality. Meanwhile, they 
only focus on data tampering on RFID tags but not the whole 
supply chain. This paper  identifies potential security threats 
especially in data tampering in RFID-enabled supply chain 
and suggest how they might be addressed using a fragile 
watermarking technology. The contributions of this work 
include: 
1) identifies the problems and requirements of tamper 
detection in RFID-enabled supply chain systems. 
2) highlights the importance of fragile watermarking 
schemes for RFID systems. 
3) surveys the relevant literature that addressed RFID data 
tampering and explored possible issues and challenges. 
4) analyzes potential applications of using fragile 
watermarking on RFID systems—RFID tag, RFID network 
stream and RFID data storage. The rest of this paper is 
organized as follows. Section II provides background 
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regarding RFID and EPC networks. Section III highlights the 
potential tamper attacks to EPC  network. Section IV presents 
details of fragile watermarking scheme and proposes possible 
applications to detect and locate any modification in RFID. 
Categorization and review of existing RFID tampering 
detection approaches is provided in Section V. Section VI 
concludes this paper with summaries and suggestions for 
future work 
I. BACKGROUND
RFID refers to a set of wireless technologies used to 
identify, capture, and transmit information from tagged 
objects to enterprise systems via radio waves. RFID is not a 
new technology; it was first used over sixty years ago by 
Britain military to identify aircraft in World War II. The early 
commercial applications involving RFID was during the 
1970s and 1980s . These commercial applications have been 
restricted to a relative small number of close loop applications, 
for example security badges, toll passes, card-keys and 
gas-pump payment systems. Currently, most RFID tagging 
and tracking applications are used for operations within a 
company. 
To take RFID beyond the confines of a single organization 
and create value for the entire supply chain, a few 
breakthroughs are needed. First, there must be a standardized 
way of uniquely identifying items within the supply chain. 
Second, there must be a standard means of discovering and 
sharing the data that describes each identified item. This leads 
to the idea of the EPC (Electronic Product Code) Network. 
The EPC was developed by the Auto-ID Center, its goal  was 
to develop a system that connects all objects to the Internet, 
the Internet of Things. A sub-goal of the Center, one that was 
needed to achieve the Internet of Things, was the 
development of a low-cost RFID protocol suitable for 
item-level tagging.. 
The low cost demanded for EPC tags causes them to be 
very resource limited. Performance of passive RFID tags is 
adversely affected by adding more functionality onto the 
silicon. Their range is reduced due to the larger power 
requirements of the tag. Typically, they can only store 
hundreds of bits; roughly have between 5000 and 10000 logic 
gates, and a maximum communication range of a few meters. 
Within this gate counting, only between 250 and 3000 gates 
can be devoted to security functions [3]. It is interesting to 
note that 20000 to 30000 gates are needed for a standard 
implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). 
Thus, most RFID tags don’t have enough computational 
power and storage capacity to perform encrypted 
communications.
II. POSSIBLE TAMPER ATTACKS
Current RFID protocols are designed to optimize 
performance with less attention paid to resilience and security 
[4]. Several possible attacks on RFID systems have been 
reported. For instance, using a small program called RFDump, 
[5] shown how vulnerable RFID tags can be: the tags could be 
easily read, altered or even deleted using an inexpensive tag 
reader which was plugged into a notebook.  
Tamper attacks may occur anywhere in the EPC network, 
which include tags, readers, middleware, EPCIS (Electronic 
Product Code Information Services) repository, EPCIS 
accessing application, local ONS (object name service), and 
enterprise application database (see Fig. 1). Here, we focus 
our attention on data tamper attacks. For other threats, please 
refer to [2] and [6] for details. We classify the possible tamper 
attacks on RFID system into four categories based on the 
locations where they may be attacked: 
Fig. 1:  Potential tamper attacks in RFID networks 
1) RFID tag tampers. Tampering attacks on RFID tags can 
be divided into three types: 
a) Tag data manipulation: Malicious RFID reader can 
either corrupt or manipulate the data contained in a tag. Using 
a reader one can write data into the memory banks of a tag to 
suit the adversary's requirements. Equipped with the 
misleading security features, the fake products can avoid 
closer inspection. 
b) Tag spoofing: Spoofing, which imitates the behavior of 
a genuine label, presents a serious threat to an RFID system as 
it adds a new dimension to thieving. A thief may replace a 
valid item with a fake label or replace the label of an 
expensive item with that of a fake label with data obtained 
from a cheaper item. Fake labels may also be used to create 
imitation items. However, because removing and reapplying 
authentic labels is costly, this attack does not threaten RFID 
system in a large scale. 
c) Tag cloning: The ability to create clones of tags can be 
used as a means to overcome counterfeit protection (e.g., in 
passports and drug labels) and as a preparatory step in a large 
scale theft scheme. 
2) RFID stream tamper. In RFID applications, data are 
treated as a continuing stream instead of static datasets, 
delivered over a wireless network. Since streaming data are 
usually transmitted over unreliable networks, malicious 
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parties can easily inject offensive data into the stream. [7] 
revealed a replay attack during RFID communications, which 
the attacker uses a tag’s response to a rogue reader’s 
challenge to impersonate the tag to destroy stream integrity. 
In such applications, RFIDs can be more vulnerable than 
other mechanisms, due to their ability to be read at a distance 
by covert readers. 
3) Electronic pedigree tamper. In an attempt to ensure 
only authentic products are distributed through the supply 
chain, some regulatory agencies have implemented or are 
considering provisions requiring a pedigree for products [8]. 
Clearly an item's electronic pedigree plays a vital role through 
counterfeit and gray market detection, shrinkage avoidance 
and accurate and autonomous unit level inventory 
management, but if this electronic pedigree was accessed 
unauthorized, illegally modified, or fabricated, most of the 
aforementioned advantages may be lost . 
4) ONS data tamper. ONS can be considered as a DNS 
(Domain Name System) server; therefore, the security threats 
related to DNS server are also applicable to ONS [8]. Threats 
in this category include file corruption, unauthorized updates, 
ONS cache poisoning, IP address spoofing, and data 
interception. 
III. WHY FRAGILE WATERMARKING 
Since RFID tag carries data which represent unique item 
identifiers as well as product details to which it is attached. 
This data is very significant and if this is tampered with, it can 
have severe consequences. Take Pharmaceutical industry for 
example, if the tags are tampered, they could represent wrong 
drug when scanned by the RFID reader, this case could be 
even worse when smart shelf are coupled with RFID 
technology, wrong drugs might be picked up and delivered 
because the tampered RFID tag could points to a different 
drug, and this could even result in incorrect diagnosis. Also, 
data tampering of this nature can raise repudiation issues in 
collaborative environments when this data mismatch occurs. 
In order to prevent information from intercepting or 
modifying by unauthorized parties while it is in transit across 
networks or resident on storage media, an effective data 
protection mechanism is needed [9]. 
A. Cryptographic Method and Its Limitations 
Although message authentication is a simple approach to 
anti-counterfeiting RFID tag, this approach is not possible 
except for the tags using the ISO 14443 standard, because 
most RFID tags don’t have enough computational power and 
storage capacity to perform encrypted communications.  
To verify the integrity of RFID stream, we may also use a 
digital signature to sign packets in the stream individually. 
However the computational load on both the sender and the 
receiver is too high to make this approach practical. Also if a 
packet is missing, the authentication chain is broken and 
subsequent packets can not be authenticated. 
Similarly, to check the integrity of database relations in 
electronic pedigree or ONS, a naïve method is to use the 
traditional digital signature [10]. Though this method is 
simple, there are some problems with it. First, the signature 
can only be used to verify whether the database has been 
modified or not; it cannot be used to localize and characterize 
the modifications. Second, if there is a need to make some 
necessary modifications to the database, we have to compute 
a new signature and discard the previous one. Besides, it is 
computationally intensive to generate and verify the 
signatures.
B. Requirements of RFID Security Protocol 
It is clear that cryptographic mechanisms are not enough to 
ensure RFID data integrity. Considering the severe 
constraints imposed on the available power (include the 
antenna), the extremely computational capabilities, the small 
memory size and the characterize of IC design (e.g. number 
of gate available for security requirement), RFID security 
protocols must be lightweight in practice [4]. Also, security 
need not reside solely on the tag but the whole supply chain, 
the tag is only one piece of the security puzzle. It is worth to 
point out that  for many applications, such as supply chain 
management, the counterfeiting of a single tag is not a worry. 
The counterfeiting of tags in bulk quantities is the issue that 
they worry about. Therefore, the ease with which a single tag 
can be counterfeited is not the only criterion. The ease with 
which tags may be counterfeited in bulk is the primary 
concern for retail and for pharmacy. 
C. Fundamental of Watermarking  
Digital watermarking, which allows an individual to add 
hidden copyright notices or other verification messages to 
digital media, can be a promising technique to protect RFID 
data from illicit manipulation and duplication. A generic 
watermarking model is depicted in Fig. 2. Where, A(.) is the 
attack mechanism; S is the original data before being 
watermarked; D(.) is the watermark detection function; K is 
the secret key used in both watermark embedding and 
watermark detection; and M is the watermark to be embedded 
in S. The watermark encoding function E(.) embeds M into S
through K, and produces watermarked data X. Attackers may 
try to remove M from X by modifying X into Y. However, 
with a resilient watermarking scheme, the owner can still 
extract M0 = M from Y through D(.) and K.
Fig. 2. A generic watermarking model 
A good fragile watermarking scheme should satisfy the 
following desired properties [10]: 
1) The embedded watermark is imperceptible: The 
embedded watermark should only introduce minor distortions 
113
to the original data. Such modifications should not affect the 
usefulness of the data. 
2) Prevent illegal embedding and verification: The whole 
process is governed by a key. Only an authorized person who has a 
key can embed, extract, and verify watermarks. This prevents 
unauthorized persons from inserting a false watermark or illegally 
verifying watermarks. 
3) Blind verification: The original unmarked data should 
not be required for watermark verification. 
4) The extracted watermark indicates the locations of 
alterations: In case of modifications, the embedded 
watermarks should indicate where the modifications are. 
5) Characterize alterations: It is desirable that the 
embedded watermarks enable not only detection but also 
characterization of possible modifications so that it is 
possible to determine the kinds of modifications that have 
been made. 
IV. RFID TAMPER DETECTION
There have been some research done to address the RFID 
data integrity issues using watermarking technologies [2] [7]. 
However, these researches are still limited which only focus 
on data tamper problem on certain portions of the RFID 
system such as RFID tag or RFID communications, but not 
the whole streaming of supply chain. In this section, we will 
reveal potential security threats especially in data tampering 
in RFID-enabled supply chain and show how they might be 
resolved using a fragile watermarking technology. 
A. Tamper Detection in RFID Tags 
[2] proposed a scheme to embed a fragile watermark in the 
serial number partition of the RFID tag. See Fig. 3. The 
process contains four stages: 
Fig.  3. Generic watermarking model for RFID tags 
1) Watermark generation. The watermark is generated by 
using a pseudo random number generator (PRNG). The input 
is the data of EPC manager (EM) or Object Class (OC). EM 
or OC acts as a seed that generate a unique random number 
with a desired length (8bits). 
2)  Selecting the embedding location. The RFID tag data 
structure is composed of Header, EM, OC and serial number 
(SN). To embed a watermark, some redundant space within 
RFID tag signal will be used. However, Header, EM and OC 
are used for unique identification, modifying any of this data 
may interface with the existing standard; neither do they have 
enough room. Since SN can be decided by the manufacture at 
will and it offers enough redundant space to embed the 
watermark, the embedding location is chosen at SN portion.   
3) Watermark embedding. An 8-bit watermark appended 
with an even parity bit is embedded to the first nine bits of the 
SN portion of RFID tag, show as Fig. 3(a). 
4) Tamper detection. The data stored on EM is used to 
generate the watermark using the hash function f(.), if the EM 
has changed, the generated watermark would be different 
from the one that embedded in the SN portion, then tampering 
can be easily identified,  show as Fig. 3(b). 
Although this is quite a novel method to integrate 
watermark and RFID technology together, it still has a lot of 
limitations. First, it can only work for EPC-96, but not for 
EPC-64, as the SN portion in EPC-64 only has limited 10 bits. 
Second, every time information hiding in RFID tag, it will 
occupy certain bits of SN portion of the RFID tag. So if we 
need to hide more information (including EM, OC, SN, TID, 
product properties etc.), it would be greatly reduced unique 
SN, making it infeasible. Also, the method has limited 
security because its security is ensured by keeping algorithm 
secret but not by a secret key. Moreover, the method can’t 
prevent from tag forgery or tag cloning as the data in RFID 
tag does not change any bits in both situations. 
One possible solution is to use the Code Division Multiple 
Access (CDMA) scheme, which supports multiple 
watermarks to be embedded synchronously. Thereby, we may 
use 8-10 bits to hide all these information together. Another 
possible solution is to hide some crucial information on RFID 
tags as shown below:  
1) RFID spoofing detection: The basic idea is to hide the 
detailed properties of product in the respective RFID tag, the 
properties would be checked when the RFID reader scans 
the RFID tagged product at the point of sale (POS). This 
solution could then be used to detect tag spoofing.  
2) RFID cloning detection: Since each transponder has a 
unique factory programmed chip SN (or transponder ID, TID) 
that is similar to the unique MAC address of PC network card, 
we can use the TID for cloning detection. Simple cloning 
attack can clone a similar tag SN, but can’t clone TID without 
access to hardware manufacturing. So when unique tag 
identifier by manufacturer is embedded into RFID tag, we can 
easily detect RFID cloning. 
3) Expiry date detection: We can also hide the expiry 
date of pharmaceutical drugs on the RFID tags [3]. This 
would prevent the sale of expired drugs, e.g. if an expired 
drug is scanned by the RFID reader, it would flash a signal 
indicating that this drug has already expired and should not be 
sold.
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B.  Tamper Detection in RFID Data Stream 
When RFID tagged items are moved through physical 
supply chain, RFID data are treated as a continual stream 
which consists a sequence of data element in XML structure.  
The XML structure, as shown below, includes the following 
contexts: Tag ID, Discover Time, LastSeen Time, Antenna, 
and Read Count.  
</Alien-RFID-Tag -List> 
<Alien-RFID-Tag>  
< Tag ID >8000 8004 2389 2371 </ Tag ID > 
<Discover Time> Thu Dec 04 10:14:49 PST 2007 
</Discover Time> 
<Last Seen Time> Thu Dec 04 10:14:49 PST 2007 
</Last Seen Time> 
<Antenna> 1< /Antenna > 
<Read Count>600</Read Count> 
</Alien-RFID-Tag>  
</Alien-RFID-Tag -List> 
Since the RFID streams are transmitted through unreliable 
network, malicious parties may easily inject offensive data 
into the stream. In order to authenticate completeness of 
RFID streams, two issues should be considered when signing 
streams. First, the signature scheme must be efficient enough 
to permit authentication on the fly without introducing delays. 
Second, the signature scheme must be robust enough that 
authentication remains possible even if some packets are lost. 
1) Problems and threat model. To the best of our 
knowledge, there are four possible attacks to the RFID stream 
data: 
a) Attack 1: Content alteration. Attackers may randomly 
or selectively modify some parts of the XML structure.  
b) Attack 2: Addition attack. Attackers could insert one or 
multiple XML structures into the stream. 
c) Attack 3: Delete attack. Attackers may delete one or 
multiple XML structures in the stream. 
d) Attack 4: Replay attack. An attacker could copy a 
segment of a data stream and replay it later to the receiver.  
2) Possible solutions. A simple method for detecting 
tampering on RFID stream data is to embed watermark into 
every isolated XML structure. Using a secret key K, a secure 
hash value H(i) is first computed as the hash of the 
concatenation of all individual hash values of data elements in 
XML structure. Since the watermark is embedded into the SN 
portion of tag ID, a remaining problem is that although we 
can detect modification of XML structure and insertion of 
new XML structure we cannot detect the deletion of the 
whole XML structure[7] [9]. A fragile chaining 
watermarking algorithm was proposed in [7] to verify the 
integrity of streaming data.  The data are first divided into 
groups on the fly according to a secret key and 
synchronization point. A watermark is embedded directly 
into the least significant bits of all the data elements of each 
group to ensure the completeness of the data stream. 
Watermarks are then chained across current group and next 
group. Therefore, no matter how much data are deleted, the 
deletion can be correctly detected. However, such a schema is 
quite limited when used in RFID stream. The problem is that 
the method assumes that data stream consists of numerical 
data elements can tolerate small distortion introduced by 
embedding in the least significant bits of each data element. 
The method is applicable to such applications as stock market 
analysis, sports ticker and environment sensing; however, for 
RFID data stream, the data element such as Tag ID and 
Antenna ID cannot tolerate this distortion. Directly 
embedding a watermark to the least two significant bits in 
Tag ID will cause the ID no long unique. Meanwhile, if one 
or multiple XML structures are inserted or deleted, the 
synchronization point may be added or missing, thus, causing 
incorrect grouping.   
3) Our solution. We improve the group-chaining 
watermark to detect tamper on RFID stream. Please see Fig. 4 
for details. Since the data are naturally divided into groups by 
individual XML structure, we proposed to embed a 
watermark directly into SN portion of tag ID in each group to 
ensure the completeness of the data stream. Watermarks are 
then chained across current group and next group.  
Fig. 4.  Watermarking model for RFID data stream 
The logic of the watermark embedding algorithm is as 
follows:  
a) First for each available XML structure, we compute a 
secure hash H(i) according to the secret key K.
b) Then a group of watermarks is embedded by selecting 
first n bits in the SN portion of tag ID. 
c) After that, a chaining watermark is constructed based 
on both current group hash value and next group hash value, 
which similarly is embedded into tag ID of current XML 
structure.
d) In this way, the embedded watermarks are actually 
chained so that even if the whole XML group is deleted, the 
deletion is still detectable.  
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We can use the following procedure to verify the integrity 
of the coming RFID data streams:   
Step 1: We first check the integrity of the XML group, a 
watermark constructed from the current group hash value is 
usually checked against the extracted group watermark in the 
current group. If they do not match, we can conclude 
tampering (group inserted or group modified) occurs; 
Otherwise (if the two group watermarks match), we need 
continue to verify the chaining watermark. 
Step 2: A chaining watermark constructed from the current 
group hash value and next group hash value is checked 
against the extracted chaining watermark in the current group. 
If the two chaining watermarks match, and the discover time 
in current group is close enough to current time, the current 
group is authentic and the watermark detection is successful. 
However, if the timestamp does not match, we can say this 
group is a faked reply group.  IF, however, the current 
chaining watermark does not match, we need farther verify 
the chaining watermark in next group. If the two chaining 
watermarks in next group match, we know one or multiple 
group is deleted, otherwise current group is a reply group. 
C. Tamper Detection in RFID Database  
EPCIS represent things that happen in the field (events) as 
meaningful information and to manage the contexts between 
events so that all sorts of phenomena can be traced. EPCIS 
can be used for counterfeit and gray market detection, 
shrinkage avoidance and accurate and autonomous unit level 
inventory management, but if this database was unauthorized 
accessed, illegal modified or fabricated, most of the 
aforementioned advantages may be lost. 
1) Problem. In EPCIS, the database relations contain 
independent tuples with little redundancy, and there is no 
enforced relationship between the tuples. These present new 
technical challenges for fragile database watermarking 
schemas.  
2) Possible solutions. One of the simplest approaches is to 
use a tuple-based watermark schema proposed by [9]. The 
idea of this method is as follows: Some bits of attributes of 
tuples are modified according to an embedding key to embed 
watermark bits, but the watermark bit embedded in a tuple has 
nothing to do with those embedded in other tuples. Although 
this method can still detect attributes modification and tuple 
insertion, it cannot detect tuple deletion.  
In order to add relationship between the tuples, we can 
have two possible options: One is to use the group-based 
watermark schema proposed in [9] and the other one is to use 
the chaining watermark schema proposed in [7].  
For group-based watermark schema, all the tuples are first 
divided into groups according to the number of groups g, the 
hash value of embedding key K, and the primary key Tag ID. 
Only the person who knows K and g can determine which 
group the tuple belongs to. By grouping, the tuples are no 
longer independent, the relationship between them are 
enforced. Next, watermarks are embedded into each group 
independently. In each group, there are two kinds of 
watermarks: tuple watermark W1 and attribute watermark W2.
For tuple watermark, the hash value is generated by all 
attributes values of the same tuples; the attribute watermark is 
formed according to message authentication code and the 
same attribute of all tuples in the group. In this way, the 
embedded watermarks actually form a watermark grid, which 
helps to detect, localize and characterize the modification. 
However, since grouping is controlled by an embedding 
key and the number of groups, while one or multiple tuples is 
modified or inserted, it may cause different result of grouping. 
This will unavoidably cause detection failure. For example, if 
one modified tuple changes from one group to another group, 
then tuple deletion  is found in the first group and tuple 
insertion is found in the second group, despite tuples deleted 
do not affect grouping result.  To avoid such a situation, for 
each group, we may first compare the extracted tuple 
watermark with the watermark constructed from the hash 
value of all attributes at the same tuple. If these two don’t 
match, we then conclude that one or multiple attributes of the 
tuple was modified or this is an inserted tuple. After that, we 
discard all these tuples from the grouping. We then continue 
to compare the extracted attribute watermark with the 
watermark constructed from the hash value of same attribute 
of all tuples. If the two match, we know no tamper in this 
group; otherwise, one or multiple tuple are deleted.
It is worth to note that if the number of groups is one, the 
group-based watermark schema turns to be the 
database-oriented watermark schema. In the database- 
oriented watermark schema, all the tuples are related together, 
also there should be no more changes in grouping so that the 
embedded watermarks can localize and characterize 
alteration to the database. But if there is a need to make 
necessary modifications to the database, we have to compute 
a new attribute watermark and discard the previous one. 
Besides, it is computationally intensive to generate and verify 
the attribute watermark.  
3) Now let us turn to the chaining watermark schema 
proposed in [7]. Here we make some extension of this method 
to fit for RFID database. The basic idea is first embedding 
tuple watermarks into each tuples of database, then 
constructing a chaining  watermark based on both the current 
tuple hash and the hash of next tuple, show as figure 4. In this 
way, the embedded watermark are actually chained so even if 
the tuple is deleted, the deletion is still detectable. Chaining 
watermark seems a good solution, but still limited. Although 
it has good localization capability, it can not distinguish the 
alteration each other. For example, if a tuple’s forward chain 
and backward chain are deleted, the tuple will be similar to a 
tuple inserted,  therefore it can’t  tell if there is a tuple  
inserted or tuple deleted.   
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Fig. 5. Chaining watermark  
4) Performance analysis. In general, we can classify the 
watermarking schema for database into four types: 
tuple-based method, group-based schema, database-oriented 
schema and chaining-based method. We have examined the 
database watermarking schemas in the open literature and 
summarized their relative performance, in terms of 
localization, characterize alteration, security, update and 
computational costs, in Table I. As can be seen from the table, 
there is no perfect database watermarking method that can 
gain all desired performances. Tuples-basis method has low 
computing cost, however it has bad localization. While 
group-based method and chaining-based method have good 
localization, their characterize alteration is low. While 
database-oriented method has good localization and 
characterize alteration, its computational cost and update cost 
is relatively high. 












Localization bad good good good
Delete detection X  X 
Modify detection  X X 
Insert detection  X X 









cost low Medium low high 
D. Tamper Detection in ONS 
In order to track down the relevant database, an ONS 
converts the manufacturer ID stored in the EPC into a web 
address. These ONS servers work analogously to the DNS 
used in the Internet. Tampering detection in ONS is similar to 
EPCIS. Please refer to Section V.C for details. 
V. CONCLUSION
With recent advances in RFID technologies, the low-cost 
and high visibility value of this technology brings them the 
potential for massive deployment. Though RFID adoption is 
an emerging trend in supply chain management, the use of 
RFID has also triggered significant security and privacy 
concerns [2]. To minimize costs, most RFID tags don’t have 
enough computational power and storage capacity to perform 
basic encrypted communications. Thus, traditional RFID 
related cryptography and security research may not be 
applied directly in this field. RFID security issue is still an 
open research question.  
This paper highlights potential security threats especially 
in data tampering in RFID-enabled supply chain and shows 
how these threats might be resolved using a fragile 
watermarking technology. Here our security analysis focus 
on Gen 2 tag which  is secure for its intended application, the 
retail supply chain, but  not for many other applications. We 
have discussed various security attacks on Gen2 RFID 
systems, explored possible tampering detection using fragile 
watermarking on Gen 2 RFID tags, RFID data streams, ONS 
servers and enterprise database, surveyed relevant literature 
that has addressed the RFID data tampering issue, and 
discussed challenge and possible solutions. We provide a 
comprehensive approach to address data tampering problem 
in RFID in the hope to inspire more research in this field.
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